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Habsburg Ruthenian/Rusyn Identities
Part I: The Habsburg Lands
Robert Goodrich
I use “identity” throughout this article with the express understanding that identities are
fluid, constructed, subjective, malleable, overlapping, and even internally contradictory. Identity
is as much about “identification;” identity has as much or more to do with who is doing the
identifying and labeling. Usually in modern societies, this is the state in the form of passports,
censuses, and the legal definitions that define access to every aspect of civil life. Of course, despite
the power of these naming agents, such identifying does not create an internal sameness for those
in a group so labeled. Distinctiveness, resistance, and alternatives always opposed the desired
bounded groupness of the political forces.1
Yet the goal of the identifier remains – to convince those labeled that the label has an
intrinsic value, that the identified is the thing they are labeled, for good or ill. Clearly, the state
puts incredible effort into such attempts; the obsession with ethnic labels on every imaginable form
or application attests to how central this identifying is. It thus presupposes a firm belief by the
labeling agents that these imposed identities have useful, even essential meaning that should be
used in critical decisions. Is it any surprise that, within months of invading Ukraine in 2022 or
annexing Crimea in 2014, Russia issued new passports in the occupied territories? Yet the
changing and inconsistent identifications for various ethnicities illustrates both the primary role of
state power in identification and the mutability of claims to identity. All people experience evershifting attempts to identify them based on rapidly changing contexts. Naturally, they often resist
or alter or integrate on their own terms such identifications.
Not surprisingly, then, throughout the Habsburg era of control of Ruthenian land (1772 –
1918) the construction of a Ruthenian/Rusyn identity proved a multidirectional endeavor.2
Ruthenian nationalism, as defined primarily by the desire for a separate nation-state, was, however,
not a major force within the Habsburg lands (the strength of that idea lay elsewhere, in Russian
Dnieper Ukraine).3 Within the Habsburg lands, Ruthenians instead pursued a mix of alternate
collective self-identifications. Some of these had a sweeping, integrative quality meant to unite
historically disparate groups (Pan-Slavism or Austro-Slavism), but most depended much more on
local relations to neighboring ethnic groups and the Habsburg state.
We should therefore keep in mind Benedict Anderson’s understanding of the “nation” as a
construct rather than an ahistorical phenomenon.4 As the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch argued:
“Now the ‘nation’ is not, of course, an eternal category, but was the product of a long and
complicated process of historical development in Europe. For our purposes, let us define it at the
outset as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of
objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical,
historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness.”5 Given the “subjective”
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nature of ethno-national identity, we should not be surprised that this identity could be interpreted
in competing, or, perhaps better stated, interchangeable ways.6 In any event, this collective
consciousness required a collective sense of a shared past – the national myth, often interpreted by
separatists as a teleologically driven destiny to form a ethno-nation-state. As corollaries, this
identity required a certain density of shared linguistic and cultural attributes as well as a notion of
intra-group equality, though an equality that could find numerous political expressions (from
clerical-conservative to liberal/democratic to socialist).
It is certainly true that, following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918
(and Russia), the creation of new states such as Poland or Ukraine led to a constant barrage of new
identifications from the combined political and cultural forces of the new homelands. As postWorld War One ancestral homelands congealed in Europe into the nation-states we see today,
generally quite violently, most contemporaries and their descendants adopted the new national
labels, even if their ancestors had not. Their national myths were subsequently rewritten to erase,
trivialize, or stigmatize the previously held alternative identities. Let us simply keep in mind that
identifications rarely exist in a singular form or remain static across time and context. So it was
and is with Ruthenians (and Ukrainians).
Therefore our questions are: what were the shared attributes of Ruthenians? And what were
the articulated possibilities for Ruthenian identity under the Habsburgs? But first, let us engage in
a brief digression to see how just one example of Ruthenian identity has emerged Hydra-like in
modern narratives.
Yurii-Frants Kulchytskyi and Coffee
Food and drink are always part of cultural identity. The recent effort of enroll the “culture
of Ukrainian borscht cooking” in UNESCO’s List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of
Urgent Safeguarding shows how powerfully cuisine contributes to ethnic identity.7 A good
Ukrainian host, for example, might traditionally start with tea before serving borscht, but let’s start
with coffee since it introduces us to a Ruthenian folk hero.
To say that Central and Eastern Europeans like coffee is to understate the point
dramatically. Since the 1700s, much of the day has revolved around coffee to the point of
ritualization. In the Habsburg lands, coffee house culture became the heart of political and artistic
life by the middle of the 19th century, and the variety of coffee styles available would have put
Starbucks to shame. Its role continues to be so important that in October 2011 UNESCO listed the
“Viennese Coffee House Culture” as another “Intangible Cultural Heritage.”
But wait – German Vienna? Isn’t the point to explore Ruthenian identity? Indeed. Coffee
was as multinational as the empires of Europe. How coffee came to Europe via the Ottoman
Empire during the 17th century is a story worth telling since it reveals much about the polycentric
nature of Ruthenian identity.
Legend (and some history) talk about Yurii-Frants Kulchytskyi (the romanized version of
his Ruthenian name, Юрій-Франц Кульчицький; German, Georg Franz Kolschitzky; Polish,
Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki). According to the stories, initially written by the Viennese author
Gottfried Uhlich in 1783, soldiers from the combined Polish and Habsburg army, which naturally
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included Ruthenians in its ranks, found sacks of unknown beans in the abandoned Ottoman camp
after the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683. The Polish king and leader of the combined army, Jan
Sobieski, glad to pay for services at so cheap a price, offered the seemingly worthless beans
thought to be camel fodder to the spy and courier Kulchytskyi, who had repeatedly snuck through
enemy lines to coordinate the relief attack. Kulchytskyi had long lived in the Ottoman Empire,
where coffee was widely drunk, and knew the value of the beans. He used the beans to open the
first coffee house, experimented with sugar and milk, and the rest is history.8 Today Kulchytskyi
is a multinational folk hero from Austria to Poland to Ukraine, honored with statues, street names,
memorial plaques, festivals, and the status of informal patron saint of coffee shops.
A wonderful story, but without much evidence regarding the specifics. The true story,
however, is just as engaging. There was a real Kulchytskyi. He was a Ruthenian, likely from in or
near Sambir in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth near L’viv (the region that would later
become Austrian Bukovina in what is now western Ukraine). He was born in 1640 into a noble
family that had just converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. He apparently spent time among
the Zaporozhian Cossacks as well as in the Ottoman Empire (legend claims as an Ottoman prisoner
of war who was sold as a slave to Serbian merchants from whom he purchased his freedom). More
likely he worked as a translator for the Belgrade branch of the merchant Austrian Oriental
Company and served several well-placed Habsburg diplomats and merchants (many operated as
both) engaged in relations with the Ottoman Empire. He spoke Ruthenian, Polish, Turkish,
German, Magyar, and Romanian and had immersed himself in Ottoman culture so that, when the
siege of Vienna began in 1683, he was perfectly positioned to act as a spy.
He apparently did receive a share of coffee beans (either as pay, spoils of war, or purchased
– the historical details are unclear), which he peddled as coffee door to door. The town council,
after repeated petitions by Kulchytskyi, granted him a house with the right to operate a business in
1685. He sold the house within a year and died of tuberculosis in 1694. As for opening a coffee
house? The first documented Viennese coffee house was actually opened in 1685 by Johannes
Theodat, an Armenian (who was possibly a Greek – Greece and Armenia were part of the Ottoman
Empire, readily confused by Habsburg Catholics due to their Eastern Christianity, and both were
already part of the coffee-drinking world).
But what does this culinary genesis story tell us about Ruthenian identity? A great deal. It
reveals the intertwining of the various regions and the inapplicability of modern nation-state
narratives to the region. Kulchytskyi, depending on which source one reads, is described as either
Polish, Ukrainian, Ruthenian, Austrian, occasionally Serbian, or even Armenian. He moved
between a series of multinational countries from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the
Zaporozhian Sich to the Ottoman Empire to the Archduchy of Austria in the Holy Roman Empire.
His family history also expressed the dynamic spectrum of Christianity in Central Europe of
Orthodoxy, Uniate (Byzantine Rite Catholicism), Latin Rite Catholicism, and Islam. He was as
multilingual as the region. In short, he operated in a context that did not prioritize one’s ethnic
identity in any modern nationalist sense.
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Indeed, his family name and origins deserve a closer look. Born in 1640, Kulchytskyi likely
drew his name from his birthplace, the village of Kulczyce near Sambir – then part of the Polish–
Lithuanian Commonwealth, intermittently part of the Ottoman Empire, later part of Habsburg
Galicia (1772 – 1918), then Poland (1918 – 1939), then the USSR (1939 – 1990), and now in
western Ukraine. He was born into the old Orthodox-Ruthenian noble family KulchytskyiShelestovych, although his father had converted to Catholicism, likely as part of Polonization since
it was the state religion of the Kingdom of Poland.
The family was thus part of the shliakhta (Ukrainian: шля́хта; Polish: szlachta) – a
primarily ethnic-based noble estate of Ruthenians that enjoyed certain legal and social privileges,
mostly concentrated around Sambir. Unlike their ethnic Polish counterparts, the Ruthenian
shliakhta played only a marginal role in regional society, which was instead dominated by
Orthodox priestly families who formed a separate tight-knit hereditary caste that constituted the
wealthiest and most highly educated group within the ethnic population. There was considerable
overlap between priests and nobles, however, with many priestly families also belonging to the
nobility.9 These families tended to be largely immune to Polonization, which makes Kulchytskyi’s
father’s conversion all the more interesting. Nonetheless, they were also overwhelmingly
politically loyal to the Commonwealth and later to the Habsburgs. Consequently, they eventually
revealed a tendency to accept cultural aspects of the Polish/Austrian elites as well, most
importantly the conversion from Eastern Orthodoxy to Byzantine Rite Catholicism and adoption
of Polish as a lingua franca.
That Kulchytskyi may have possibly worked with the autonomous Zaporozhian Cossacks
farther to the east is also intriguing. The Zaporozhian Cossacks are often the ethnic group most
closely associated with the birth of Ukrainian nationalism, but the history is complicated. During
the course of the 16th, 17th, and well into the 18th century, the Zaporozhian Cossacks were a strong
political and military force that challenged the authority of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth,
the Tsardom of Russia, and the Crimean Khanate. Not surprising, the Zaporozhian Cossack Host
went through a series of conflicts and alliances involving these three regional powers. Ultimately,
however, a separate nation-state failed to fully materialize, and, after supporting an uprising
against the Russian tsar in the 18th century, the Host was forcibly disbanded and much of the
population relocated to the Kuban region in the south edge of the Russian Empire around the
Crimean while others founded different cities in what is now southern Ukraine and eventually
became state peasants.10 In any event, while Kulchytskyi may have served with the Zaporozhians,
he did not identify as one of them, and the Host’s territory was always outside the future Habsburg
lands. His identity remained focused much farther west – in the Kingdom of Poland and the
Habsburg Monarchy.
In fact, Kulchytskyi spent his later life in Habsburg imperial capital, Vienna, which quickly
embraced coffee; the Slavic lands to the east, however, had a different experience. The Ottoman
influence may have led to some Turkish style coffee shops opening in the Ruthenian borderlands
with Russia, but coffee was not popular or easily accessible in most of that region even in the early
1900s. During the Russian Revolution, when the first modern Ukrainian nation-state became part
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of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin allegedly declared coffee as bourgeois – promoting tea
consumption instead. As a result, coffee fell out of favor for most of the 20th century.
If available, however, coffee has a way of becoming part of consumption. It returned to
Ukraine after the USSR collapsed in 1990, when low-priced soluble coffee entered the market.
The late 1990s then introduced the country to Italian espresso machines, and small coffee shops
and trucks started to pop up. However, most Ukrainians could only access lower quality coffee
and brew it cup by cup. Most recently, though, third wave coffee shops started appearing in 2015,
accompanied by a growth in roasting and domestic and commercial coffee consumption.
Contributing to this was the country’s 2014 financial crisis and conflict with Russia following the
annexation of Crimea. This devalued the Ukrainian currency (the hryvnia) against the Euro and
Dollar, making the import of roast coffee financially unfeasible and encouraging an increase in
local roasting. The result today is a young but dynamic coffee culture rapidly changing the drinking
culture and further orienting Ukraine on Central European patterns.
With this context, let us see how Kulchytskyi has been remembered from a national and
ethnic stance. Uhlich’s original stories made him out to be an Armenian – not surprising since
Armenian merchants were among the first and most successful coffee brewers in Vienna.11 Most
Austrian German publications, however, initially tended to describe him as an Austrian national
with a Polish or Galician or Ruthenian ethnicity; they thus contextually moved him from the 17th
century to after the Austrian annexation of Galicia in the 1770s. More recently, German-language
sources generally evade questions of his ethnicity, focusing instead on his legend.
Poles, on the other hand, uniformly and unequivocally claim him as a Pole, frequently
without the clarification of his Ruthenian ethnicity. His inclusion in the recent collection of
biographical sketches Made in Poland axiomatically presumes a Polish identity (the brief entry
characteristically provides absolutely no ethnically nuanced commentary).12 In Vienna, his “fellow
countrymen” in Warsaw, Poland dedicated a memorial tablet in 1983 at his home. And the Polish
postal service issued a stamp with his likeness in 2009.
Ukrainians, meanwhile, have embraced Kulchytskyi as a nationalist folk hero. Popular
literature proudly and unambiguously declares him a Ukrainian.13 In 2010, his presumed
hometown unveiled a monument to him; L’viv did the same in 2013. Each presents him as a
Cossack next to a coffee service. Even under Soviet rule Ukrainian authors provided a nationalist
spin to his biography. In 1933 Ivan Filipchak heroized him in Kulchytskyi, the Hero of Vienna: A
Historical Story from the 17th Century.14 That same year, Ivan Nimchuk described him as “an
Orthodox Ukrainian, and the descendants of his family still live today… [He came from] a noble
village, famous for having produced many conscious Ukrainian intellectuals.”15
Yet for the average American, one’s first effort to uncover his identity might well be with
Wikipedia. But a quick search does little to settle the matter. The English Wikipedia article refers
to him as a “Polish nobleman” and explicitly defines his nationality as “Polish.” Yet it also states
that he was from an “Orthodox-Ruthenian noble family.” The article mentions that he spoke
“Ruthenian (Ukrainian),” conflating the two languages (and thus ethnicities). Further, the same
article links to another article on the “Szlachta” (discussed above), which avoids any explicit ethnic
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identification for this medieval caste. So, Polish, Ruthenian, and Ukrainian – and Orthodox but
not Catholic – either all these are synonymous or the article lacks contextual nuance.16
The ethno-nationalist influence on Wikipedia becomes evident if we search other language
sites for their entries on Kulchytskyi. German Wikipedia avoids any ethno-nationalist label for
him at all. The Polish site claims that he “considered himself ‘a native Pole.’” The Ukrainian site
calls him a “Ukrainian nobleman” and lists his nationality as “Ukrainian.” The Russian site avoids
any attempt at an ethno-nationalist label and instead states that he was born in the “Russian
Voivodeship of the Crown Lands of the Commonwealth” – a claim that raises the terminological
issue of what “Russian” meant in the late medieval and early modern context. “Russian” is a direct,
literal translation of russiae (Polish: ruskie; Ukrainian: Руське). However, the understanding of
the term at the creation of the Voivodeship in 1434 was different. Russiae originally connoted in
the West those East Slavs in the Lithuanian Commonwealth who were not Muscovites. Indeed, the
territory is most often translated as the “Ruthenian Voivodeship” in modern English scholarship
to underscore this ethnic distinction – a distinction easily lost on a Russian reader, rendering an
automatic Russian nationalist understanding of the identity of the inhabitants of the Voivodeship.
In the end, then, we can see how the complicated dynamics of the past no longer make
sense to us. Trapped in the logic of ethno-nationalist identities, we edit the past, consciously or
subconsciously, to what makes sense in our own paradigms. We impose simple national identities
linked to an existing nation-state, and thus we (or our ancestors) become Ukrainians or Poles or
Austrians or Russians, but never (or rarely) Ruthenian or Rusyn (or Hutsul, Lemko, or any other
of the many ethnicities that fit or have been forced under the overarching category of Ruthenian
or russiae). That these peoples lived in multiethnic regions as part of equally non-nation-state
empires and did so without an overarching or even aspirational nationalist identity makes the story
either too complicated or too politically unusable.
Ruthenian Visions of Identity
If we have established, or at least asserted, that Habsburg Ruthenian identity was polyvalent, what were these alternatives? At least four dominant versions appeared in the course of the
19th century: assimilationist, nationalist, pan-Slavic, and confederative.
First, the strongest possibility lay in gradual assimilation. Polish elites had been
incentivizing this option among the Ruthenian elites since the incorporation of medieval Galicia
into the Polish Kingdom in the 14th century.17 The process of Rusyn Polonization had similar
corollaries throughout the Habsburg lands: Magyarization in the Kingdom of Hungary, especially
aggressive after the creation of the Dual Monarchy in 1867;18 Slovakization as a less aggressive,
non-state-driven approach in Upper Hungary; Serbianization and Croatization among the
Pannonian Rusyns; Romanianization in Bukovina. Parallel to this, Germanization was always an
option throughout the empire. In some cases, as with Polinization, Polish nationalism tended to an
exclusionary nature, willing only to integrate the Ruthenian elite provided they converted and
changed language. The step was not such a hard one given that the Ruthenian elite were already
Catholic and largely spoke Polish fluent language. The Ruthenian peasantry, on the other hand,
was much less likely to see any benefits from such a step; there were simply no incentives for the
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poor. The result throughout the Habsburg lands where Ruthenians were a politically subordinate
group was all too frequently a resort to active and passive coercion by the dominant local ethnic
group: refusal to recognize linguistic, religious, and cultural autonomy (especially in education),
selective military conscription for troublemakers, special fees, insistence on the dominant language
in legal proceedings, discrimination in economic matters, etc.
Second, Ruthenians could follow Czech historian Miroslav Hroch’s stages in creating an
identity expressly linked to the goal of a separate ethno-nation-state.19 The problem here was that
Ruthenians were divided between distinct historical regions, problematizing a single unifying
national myth formation. While Galician Ruthenians could plausibly look back to a reimagined
medieval “Kingdom of Ruthenia” as the fertile soil for such an identity, this possibility was much
more awkward in Bukovina, among the Pannonian Rusyns, as well as the Rusyns in Upper
Hungary. In each, the historical connections simply went in other directions.
Third, a pan-Slavic identity could attempt to knit together all of the Rusyn regions either
within or outside of Habsburg territorial limits.20 This idea had its strongest proponents in the
Russian Empire, both from Ukrainians and Russians, though for different reasons. Pan-Ukrainian
nationalists asserted the fraternal Ukrainian-ness of all Habsburg Rusyns and built upon an
alternate historical locus – that of Kyivan Rus. This approach subsumed, rather than rejected,
Habsburg Ruthenia and its antecedent in the Kingdom of Ruthenia. For them, Habsburg
Ruthenians simply had to keep tracing their history back a bit beyond that kingdom and to its Rus
predecessor. But while Ukrainian nationalists increasingly pushed towards the creation of a
Ukrainian nation-state, Russian officials used pan-Slavism to knit all Ruthenians and Ukrainians
into the tsarist imperial framework by defining Kyivan Rus as the precursor of modern Russia
where its core constituents (Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians) were Russian brothers.
The appeal to Ruthenians was the powerful Russian-backed counterbalance to ethnic rivals
within the Habsburg lands. It thus found expression as Russophilia. A Ruthenian pan-Slavic vision,
however, remained restricted, largely due to both Russian and Habsburg repression. Ukrainophilia,
in effect a type of pan-Ukrainianism (a sense of unity between all Habsburg Ruthenians and
Russian Ukrainians, with but one variant demanding an independent Ukrainian nation-state),
however, ultimately found greater support. In part this lay in the simple fact that Ruthenians had
generally cultivated closer ties to Ukrainians than to Russians. The brutality of the Russian
Orthodox Church towards the Ruthenian Greek Catholics had left a lingering bitterness. But also
Habsburg elites simply saw less threat in the Ukrainophiles, who, after all, were largely
institutionalized in the Greek Catholic Church and repeatedly displayed their loyalty. In fact, there
was, from a Habsburg perspective, the possibility of using Ukrainophilism to weaken the Russian
rival and actually expand Habsburg territory farther east into Russian territory. As farfetched as
this may seem, Habsburg foreign policy pursued a consistent similar policy against the Ottoman
Empire while simultaneously looking for ways to thwart Russian expansion into the Balkans.
Fourth, Ruthenians could continue to remain ethnically distinct, indeed with an increasing
collective self-identity as Ruthenians, but remain loyally so within the Hapsburg multiethnic
framework. By the First World War, this trend predominated, in no small part because it risked
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little and retained the support of Habsburg officials who always remained more interested in a
dynastic logic where loyalty flowed through imperial citizenship regardless of ethnicity. All that
was needed was the continued expansion of Ruthenian cultural rights, to be followed by political
balancing against other groups (Poles, Magyars, Romanians). This could be accomplished with
local reforms in the regional diets and universities, through administrative-territorial reform (for
example, splitting Galicia into a Polish west and a Ruthenian east), or a more sweeping
reimagination of the monarchy as a dynastically conjoined confederation with a Slavic or even
Ruthenian leg. All were viable, had precedents, and were either already underway or were
seriously debated at the highest level.
Habsburg Exonyms and Endonyms
Given the powerful role of the state in shaping identity, how did Habsburg officials identify
Ruthenians? Official ethnographic census data in 1851 listed numerous Slavic groups, including
“Ruthen.”21 Traditionally and consistently until 1918, this term was translated as Ruthenian –
never as Russian or Ukrainian. No other official categories indicated a relevant alternate ethnic
affinity such as Rusyn or Rusnak or other local endonyms, though these existed in certain
ethnographic and nationalist circles. Only in 1910 did the official Cisleithanian census included a
cautious qualifier in a recognition of the growth of Ukrainophilia, listing “Ruthenian (Ukrainian),”
of which there were 3,997,831 speakers (7.78% of the monarchy); it was the primary language of
Bukovina (38.4%), where it was followed in frequency by Romanian, and the second language of
Galicia (40.2%) after Polish. The Transleithanian census of that year eschewed any updated
mention of “Ukrainian,” only listing a small number of “Ruthenians” (2.3%). The Kingdom of
Croatia-Slavonia similarly only provided “Ruthenians” for its small Pannonian Rusyn population
(0.3%).22 Habsburg officials, as well as ethnographers and linguists, employed the category
unproblematically (from their perspective).
Let us look at one small scholarly linguistic example. In 1893, Stephan Smal-Stockyj and
Theodor Gartner published the first edition of the study of the contemporary Rusyn language,
Rusyn Language Grammar, published in Vienna. In 1913, it was in its 3rd edition under the same
title. Yet the 1919 edition carried the title of Ukrainian Grammar [Ukraïnsʹka hramatyka]; the title
page also featured a flag of the new Ukrainian state.23 Smal-Stockyj and his Grammar exemplify
how dependent on political realities ethnic identity was and how rapidly a conceptual shift (such
as from Ruthenian to Ukrainian) could occur. Smal-Stockyj was a Galician scholar and politically
active in socialist-democratic circles. He published extensively on the Rusyn language. 24 During
the Habsburg era, Smal-Stockyj dutifully served the Habsburg state even while consistently
striving for the full cultural autonomy and political equality of Ruthenians. As a professor of Rusyn
at Czernowitz University, he became central to the Ruthenian cultural revival in Bukovina and
served as a member of the Austrian parliament. He saw no contradiction between a confident
Ruthenian identity and a loyal Hapsburg one.
Lest one doubt either his Habsburg loyalty or his Ruthenian-ness, his record during World
War One indicates his allegiance. In 1914 he joined the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,
founded in L’viv. But the notion of “liberation” was restricted; it was established by Ukrainian
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emigrants from Russian Dnieper Ukraine and had the express support of the Habsburg state as a
means of undermining Russian cohesion. There was no (public) discussion of liberating Habsburg
Ruthenia.25 In 1917, he led the charity, propaganda, and publishing activities of the Ukrainian Sich
Riflemen – the only exclusively Ruthenian unit in the Austrian army that had been formed at the
start of the war in 1914. He also co-founded the Graycoats, the popular name of the First RifleCossack Division formed by the Austrian army in Volodymyr-Volynskyi in 1918 from RussianUkrainian prisoners of war.26 The obvious goal of each unit was to support the Habsburg war
effort, not Ruthenian independence.
Figure: Members of the Austrian Ukrainian Sich Riflemen
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Figure: Officers of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (1915)27

Yet leaving Smal-Stockyj’s story here would completely distort his (and the region’s)
political trajectory. After all, as the Habsburg empire collapsed, he did not hesitate to engage his
formidable skills and energy in the creation of a pan-Ukrainian state. In 1918 he represented the
short-lived West Ukrainian People's Republic’s Ministry of Military Affairs in Vienna, and in 1919
he became its semi-official ambassador to Prague. In addition, those some military units that had
fought so valiantly for Austria-Hungary turned on a dime in 1918 to become the most important
military units to fight for the emerging Ukrainian state.28
Clearly, once the Hapsburg state ceased to exist and the option of a Ukrainian state
presented itself as one of many possible successors, Smal-Stockyj and his compatriots had no
trouble updating their allegiances and, with it, their identity. The point, though, is that this decisive
shift occurred only after the political reality of Austria-Hungary disappeared entirely. With no
institutional framework for the Ruthenian confederative identity, other options filled the void.
Thus only after the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the creation of a Ukrainian state, did his Rusyn
Grammar become the Ukrainian Grammar. Prior to that moment in 1918, however, Ruthenian
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made historical sense, and, with its synonymous variants “Rusyn” and “Rusnak,” was widely used
as an endonym by the Ruthenian population.
Similarly, most outside observers accepted the Habsburg’s Ruthenian classifications
(Russia being the notable exception by frequently insisting on the translation of russiae and Rus
as Russian). In 1911, the Encyclopædia Britannica mentioned only Ruthenians in its article on the
Bukovinian city of Czernowitz. Its entry on “Ruthenians” included a full paragraph, referring to
them as “those of the Little Russians who are Austrian subjects.” For “Ukraine,” however, it
granted a scant two sentences to define it simply as a “frontier.”29 The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia
likewise employed Ruthenian almost exclusively, referring to “the Ukraine” only as the border
area of “Little Russia;” similar to Britannica, it regarded inhabitants of that area as a subcategory
of Russians, in explicit distinction to the Habsburg Ruthenians.30 The contemporary Germanlanguage press generally, and uniformly within Austro-Hungary, regarded Ruthenian as a natural
category.31 Thus until the end of Austria-Hungary, the dominant external understanding of the East
Slav ethnic groups in the Habsburg lands who did not fit as Poles, Slovaks, and Czechs, not to
mention the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian South Slavs, remained decidedly Ruthenian.
A Ukrainian identity certainly co-existed, especially by 1900, within Austria-Hungary, but,
as Smal-Stockyj exemplified, it either belonged to Russian Ukrainian ex-patriates or to Ruthenians
who did not necessarily equate it with the notion of a separate pan-Ukrainian state that included
contemporary Habsburg possessions. Ukrainian consequently remained (and remains) bound up
with a particular nationalist movement that emerged at a specific moment in time and is now
inextricably linked to the modern Ukrainian state. This Ukrainian identity is perfectly valid, but it
evolved historically as but one variant. The contemporary and earlier Ruthenian/Rusyn/Rusnak
identities, some of which persist today in newer understandings, especially in Carpathia, among
the Pannonian Rusyns of Serbia and Croatia, and in North American immigrant communities, are
equally valid and, but for the traumatic history of the 20th history, may well have remained
dominant since they were culturally as well as institutionally entrenched until their violent
unmooring in 1918.
Territorial Ruthenia
The map below lets us geographically visualize Habsburg Ruthenia as understood in 1911
(it is the yellow-green area in the far north-east).
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Figure: Map – Distribution of Races in Austria Hungary (1911)32

The map points out several important features. First, while the map is in English, it is an
original translation from the German in 1911 when “Ruthenians” was the obvious choice.
However, all modern maps drawing on this original content now consistently use “Ukrainian.”
Second, it uses the meta-category of “race,” underscoring the axiomatic association of the racelanguage-nationality triad typical of the era. The map is generally titled today as “languages,” a
re-titling that alters the map’s connotations. Third, Ruthenia centered on eastern Galicia, northern
Bukovina, and Upper Hungary. It was territorially compact with a geographically concentrated
population. Fourth, Ruthenia existed in a variety of mixed ethnic territories. One can see pockets
among the Slovaks of Upper Hungary and Rumanians of Bukovina just as one can discern pockets
of Poles in Galicia (and, though not shown on this map, with significant numbers of Jews and
Germans throughout).
Missing from the map as a fifth insight are the Pannonian Rusyns (aka Pannonian Rusnaks
or formerly Yugoslav Rusyns). There numbers were too few to warrant an indication on the map
in either Slavonia or Vojvodina. Yet they existed as distinct concentrated Rusyn groups. They had
emerged as part of the Habsburg policy of encouraging settlement along its military frontier with
the Ottoman Empire when, starting in 1745, Carpathian Rusyns began to settle in Vojvodina,
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Serbia and Slavonia, Croatia. Thus while they continued to live in Habsburg lands and maintain
ethnic settlements, they were no longer part of the historical territory of Ruthenia.33 They appear
in the Habsburg censuses for Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia as Ruthenians, but they developed a
distinct culture and dialect, what many linguists consider a micro-language.34 Despite their small
numbers, these groups again undermine any attempt to comprehensively define Ruthenia(n) even
within the Habsburg lands since they challenge whether territoriality (being part of Ruthenia) is a
necessary part of an ethnic identity.
The Pannonian Rusyns aside, here, then, was Habsburg “Ruthenia” – a multiethnic cultural
region populated by East Slavic, largely Greek Catholic Rusyn speakers. Certainly, Ruthenia as a
cultural territory had to have evolving meanings, but this dynamic nature does not mean that to
contemporary Ruthenians these were unstable. Like all groups, Ruthenians responded and adapted
to change. And here we might quickly look at this deeper history. After all, Ruthenia is actually
an exonym of medieval Latin origin when sources used “Rutheni” to describe all Eastern Slavs in
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Kievan Rus, and the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia.35 It thus
included the ancestors of modern Ukrainians, Belarusians, Carpatho-Rusyns, and Pannonian
Rusyns. This exonymic term allowed western authors, writing in Latin, to dispense with
cumbersome nuances over which they were often ill informed.36
After the end of the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia in 1349, usage narrowed when Ruthenia
increasingly referred to the broadly cultural East Slavic and Eastern Orthodox regions of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland of the 15th to 18th centuries. This territory
corresponded to what is now much of Ukraine and Belarus.37 It was also during this era that the
Greek Catholic Church developed. For the Habsburgs, who came to rule Galicia in 1772 and soon
thereafter Bukovina (part of Galicia until 1848), Ruthenia meant the lands of the Rusyns (as
distinguished from Poles and Russians) in their possession, and thus referred exclusively to nonRussian, non-Ottoman territories belonging to the Habsburgs populated by East Slavic Rusyn
speakers.38 This included Galicia, Bukovina, and parts of Upper Hungary (now in Ukraine, Poland,
Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia). As a result, Ruthenia applied in the Habsburg context
exclusively until 1918 to the East Slavic Habsburg subjects of the Kingdom of Galicia and
Lodomeria, Bukovina, and Upper Hungary. The Ruthenian elite largely accepted this
categorization. Indeed, it was at the request of the Galician Greek Catholic bishop Mykhajlo
Levitsky that the term Ruthenian became the official name for these ethnic groups within the
Austrian Empire in 1843. It was an exonym that had become and endonym. Levitsky represented
the views of the dominant conservative clerical and secular Ruthenian gentry who remained
aligned with Polish gentry circles and the Habsburg state while simultaneously promoting
Ruthenian culture and pushing for the creation of a distinct Ruthenian administrative unit (one that
divided Galicia into a Polish West and a Ruthenian East).39
Cultural Ruthenia
The destruction of a culturally understood, though not administratively distinct territorial
Ruthenia in 1918 and subsequent population movements ended the territorial leg of Ruthenian
identity. The lack of a single historically continuous geographic political center, especially one
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oriented on a Ruthenian elite, when combined with the large settlement area across multiple
jurisdictions all but guaranteed a broad spectrum of identities. The regular shifting of borders and
dramatic population movement, whether voluntary (to Pannonia in the 18th and 19th centuries) or
forced (in Poland and Ukraine after World War II) eroded historical settlement patterns, created
diasporas, and fractured the exclusivity of a single homeland. Nonetheless, language and religion
had always been and remained essential ethnic markers along with territory.
Language
As the race/language map reveals, for European nationalists since Herder the question of
identity revolved around language. They considered language an immutable link to historic
kinship. Thus they regarded language rights as an essential expression of identity and the first steps
towards political nationhood. The problem, of course, was that standardized national languages
did not exist for all groups in the Habsburg lands. The various dialects were often so distinct as to
be separate languages, and important affairs were generally conducted in either a stylized German,
the lingua franca of the empire, or Magyar. To complicate matters more, Habsburg officials
distinguished between Muttersprache (mother tongue) and Umgangssprache (language of every
day usage). One might speak Ruthenian as the mother tongue, but because one used primarily
German, one was considered a German speaker. By this logic, Jewish Yiddish speakers were listed
as Germans regardless of the dominant gentile language around them (Yiddish is a German dialect
written in Hebrew script).
But language is power. The linguist Max Weinreich popularized the quip, “A language is
a dialect with an army and navy.” Essentially, nationalism’s assertion that every nation was the
product of a kinship group united by language made the distinction between “language” and
“dialect” a political one. For nationalists a separate language automatically translated into the right
to a separate nation-state; a dialect, on the other hand, was simply a sub-group of the larger
community and thus not entitled to independence. Lest we think the distinction trivial, groups have
engaged in genocide based on this definition and at a minimum have required that all educated
citizens speak the same dialect. Yet the Habsburg lands frequently, though inconsistently,
presented a multilingual and dialectical spectrum alternative that allowed locals to decide. In fact,
the loss of dialects is primarily a post-Austro-Hungarian phenomenon as the successor nationstates imposed a rigid unity on the new states.
While all Ruthenian (and Ukrainian) identities are related linguistically, linguists, not to
mention adherents of competing national identity politics, never agreed on which of the dialects in
a spectrum stretching territorially in a wide band from Slovakia in the west to Russia in the east
constitute a standard language, a micro-language, a dialect thereof, or a dialect of another language
such as Russian or Polish. These linguistic debates were always intensely political as the different
groups sought equality with the dominant Germans and Magyars. The fact that Germans and
Magyars used language as an ethnic marker meant that other groups could frequently met with
success by making themselves useful. For example, Polish became the language of government in
Galicia in 1869; at the same time, Polish lords fiercely rejected any recognition of the Rusyn
language.
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Ethnic groups and the Habsburg state thus used language as a primary though not exclusive
way in which they defined themselves and their subjects. Ironically, however, just as interest in
local languages and identity increased in the 19th century, nation-states or groups aspiring to that
status increased the leveling of dialects as they sought to create unity by imposing a single dialect
as a unifying standardized language. It became a burning political question as to whether a
language was indeed a language or merely a dialect. To all intents and purposes, a standardized
language was recognized as prescriptive; it imposed a single way of speaking and writing.
Historically, such an effort only occurred with an attempt to impose national unity when the new
national cohesion required cultural, social, and political commonalities to create a common sense
of belonging. A common language was not necessary, but modern nationalist ideologies claimed
an organic link between language and identity. This helps to explain the ferocity of otherwise
narrow orthological debates.
Because the Rusyn language(s) was so political and existed in a dialect continuum,
Habsburg officials had trouble finding appropriate labels, as we have seen with the official
censuses from 1910. But let’s drill down a bit. As just one example of the difficulty, we can
compare language data for one district – Vojvodina in Transleithania (in modern Serbia) from the
1900 and 1910 Censuses. This region was home to the Pannonian Rusyns.
Table: Censuses from Vojvodina, 1900 – 191040
Language
Serbian
Magyar
German
Croatian,
Bunjevci &
Šokci
Romanian
Slovak
Rusyn &
Ukrainian
Others
TOTAL

1900 Census
Number
483,176
378,634
336,430
80,901

Percentage
33.7
26.4
23.5
5.6

Language
Serbian
Magyar
German
Croatian

1910 Census
Number
510,186
424,555
323,779
34,089

Percentage
33.8
28.1
21.4
2.3

74,718
53,832
12,663

5.2
3.8
0.9

Romanian
Slovak
Rusyn

75,223
56,689
13,479

5
3.7
0.9

12,394
1,432,748

0.9
100

Other
TOTAL

72,804
1,510,804

4.8
100

In 1900, officials recognized seven distinct Slavic languages, which they equated with
“nationality.” They lumped together “Rusyn and Ukrainian,” implying that they were related but
distinct dialects. Ten years later, “Ukrainian” disappeared. Officials now considered the two either
indistinguishable or “Ukrainian” irrelevant. As migrant descendants of Carpatho-Rusyns, the
Pannonian Rusyns indeed had a distinct history that never linked them to the emergence of modern
Ukrainian nationalism. Interestingly, “Ukrainian” had not been used on any census until 1880
when it was added to the “Rusyn and Ukrainian” category, before disappearing again in 1910. We
notice a similar process with “Croatian” and the appearance/disappearance of the Bunjevci and
Šokci dialects.
We can legitimately assume that the cause of the appearance/disappearance of entire
languages/nationalities in the census during this era was not the result of massive demographic
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change. Instead, the changes were entirely about changing perceptions of identity. These
perceptions arose among Habsburg officials as they attempted to create meaningful categories for
thinking about their ethnic groups. Contrary to popular contemporary perceptions, they were
attuned to these nuances, though sometimes tone deaf. The listened to the disputes among and
within the ethnic groups as they decided whether they desired inclusion in a broader category or
preferred separation.
The fact that the bitter linguistic debates over how to categorize Slavic languages has not
been settled to this day should evoke some sympathy for these 19th-century officials. Numerous
competing structures and hierarchies were repeatedly proposed. But even each of these terms was
applied differently. For example, In 1841 Ján Thomášek used “North Slavs” for the combination
of Czechs, Slovaks and Rusniaks/Rustines (Rusyns). But between 1848 and 1861, several Slavic
authors used “North Slavs” (aka “Northslavs” or “North Hungarian Slavs”) to combine Slovaks
and Rusyns living in the Upper Hungary. They, inconsistently, imagined Slovaks and Rusyns to
be one nation or ethnic group consisting of two equal tribes that inhabited a shared territory.41
Somewhat later, in 1922, North Slav was employed as a category to encompass Czechs, Slovaks,
and Poles (as divided from southern Slavs by the new states of Hungary and Austria).42 Later still,
others posited a North Slav dialect continuum of North Slavonic that includes Belarusians, Czechs,
Kashubians, Poles, Silesians, Rusyns, Russians, Slovaks, Sorbs, and Ukrainians. Others argued for
enough distinction to separate a Northwest (Czech, Kashubian, Polish, Silesian, Slovak, and
Sorbian) and Northeast (Belarusian, Russian, Rusyn, and Ukrainian) dialect family.43 Yet most
linguists now think in terms of an East Slav dialect continuum.44 And in all events much overlap
can be found between the languages and dialects even as each dialect came under the influence of
the local ethnic elite (Polish in Galicia, Slovakian in Carpathia, etc.) Regardless, new Habsburg
language classifications came about directly as a result of political needs, not linguistic shifts.45
Consistently the struggles over language were fought not only on the level of abstract legal
recognition but as part of the education systems. The Ruthenian elite starting in the early 19th
century demanded greater linguistic inclusion, especially in education, as part of their demarcation
from other, especially dominant groups, such as Poles, Romanians, and Magyars. In particular, the
German and later Polish predominance in the Galician education system increasingly became a
flashpoint for Ruthenian-Polish conflict.46 Previously, Ruthenians had largely demarcated
themselves by religion, but by the middle of the 19th century, language came to have equal or
arguably more importance. Ruthenians remained loyal during the revolutions of 1848, and the
Galician government thought it prudent to agree to introduce Rusyn language instruction in public
schools; the University of L’viv (the most important university in Ruthenia) established the first
department of Ruthenian language and literature that year; and in 1849 Rusyn became a
compulsory subject in Ruthenian schools.47
A key goal, though, remained the creation of a distinct Ruthenian university. A stylized
literary Ruthenian had been used in L’viv university’s Studium Ruthenium (1787–1809) as part of
educating seminarians for the Uniate priesthood, but elsewhere Latin remained the official
language, augmented by German.48 1848 saw armed conflicts at the university, with both Polish
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and Ruthenian students demanding concessions from Austria. Despite initial repression, the
university increasingly Polonized when reopened in 1850. By 1871, the emperor stepped in to
address Ruthenian concerns and declared Polish and Ruthenian as the official languages, but even
here Ruthenian gains consistently contended with Polish resistance. Vienna backed down and in
1879 declared Polish as the main teaching language, reducing Rusyn to an auxiliary language. In
1906, while 185 subjects were taught in Polish only 19 were in Rusyn. The inconsistency only
incited Ruthenian students who demanded a partition of the university to create a distinct
Ruthenian campus. Despite the conflicts, Ruthenian intellectual luminaires were nonetheless
drawn to the university, including Ivan Franko, as were Ukrainians, such as Mykhailo
Hrushevskyi. There were, to be sure, few academic alternatives for Ruthenians. But as PolishRuthenian relations deteriorated, Habsburg authorities again intervened in 1912, but this time on
behalf of Ruthenians and promised to create a Ruthenian university by 1916 – a promise cut short
by the onset of the war. Indeed, following the war, the university was fully Polonized with the
dismissal of Ruthenian faculty, dissolution of the Department of Ruthenian Philology, and the
ending of Rusyn language instruction.49
Religion
Just as Ruthenians were united and divided by territory and language, Christianity played
a similar dual role. Though all Ruthenians were defined by Christianity, they were distinctively
either Greek (Byzantine) Rite Catholics in Galicia and Upper Hungary or Eastern Orthodox in
Bukovina. Membership in other faiths, including Latin Rite Catholicism and Protestantism, more
often than not served as a demarcation.50 And this primacy of Christianity automatically and deeply
problematically excludes the large numbers of Jews within the historical area of settlement, even
if Rusyn were their primary language.51 Nonetheless, a sweeping generalization characterizes the
Habsburg lands as Roman Catholic, even though only two-thirds of Austro-Hungarians were
Roman Catholic, and even this figure does not represent regional diversity. For example, while
eighty percent of those in Cisleithania were Roman Catholic, only about half were in
Transleithania; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were a minority of about one fifth of the population.
Even Catholicism was divided into several distinct branches. Whereas outside of Central Europe,
Christians tend(ed) to equate Catholicism with Latin Rite Catholicism, in the Habsburg lands sui
juris Greek Rite (and also Armenian Rite Catholics) could be regionally dominant, as they were
in eastern Galicia. Similarly, the Orthodox Church of Bukovina evolved under the Habsburg into
a uniquely multiethnic Church.
In contrast to Russian Ukrainians, where the Greek Catholic church was suppressed and
Ukrainian Orthodoxy were under the authority of Russian Orthodoxy, most Habsburg Ruthenians
were heirs to the complicated history of Ruthenia as a meeting point of Orthodox and Roman
Christianities, often blurring the two where they met. As the Habsburgs extended their holdings
eastwards and southwards, they encountered local Orthodox Christians who had originally
oriented on Kyiv and Constantinople, the hearts of Russian and Greek Orthodoxy respectively.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had already dealt with this issue in Galicia. The Union of
Brest in 1596 and the subsequent Union of Uzhhorod in 1646 in Hungary had created a sui juris
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church that accepted the spiritual leadership of Rome but remained Orthodox in its liturgy and
other aspects.52 The resulting Ruthenian Uniate Church (Latin: Ecclesia Ruthena unita) emerged
from this accommodation; its members were often called Uniates, and, despite differences, were
considered in communion with Rome. Like all religious changes of the era, this one was also
accompanied by coercion and violence.53
The Austrian-Russian partition of Poland meant that both empires inherited this religious
reality along with Ruthenia. For their part, the Russians dissolved the church eparchies and forcibly
converted the population to Russian Orthodoxy.54 The Habsburgs proved more subtle and allowed
the Uniate church to continue, but reorganized it as a Greek Catholic Church under a Galician
Metropolitan with strong influence from the imperial court in Vienna. From that point on, the
Greek Catholic Church proved central in shaping and mobilizing Galician Ruthenian identity.55
Figure: Map – Religions of Austria-Hungary56

For Ruthenia, the yellow-green areas were Greek Catholic (predominant in eastern
Galicia); the gray-blue areas were Eastern Orthodox (predominant in southern Bukovina). Notice
as well that these regions, along with central Galicia, were the areas with the greatest concentration
of Jews. The existence of a large Greek Catholic population outside of Ruthenia, for example in
Hungarian Transylvania, did not, in this case, indicated a Rusyn population. Instead, these regions
were part of the borderlands with the Ottoman Empire where a similar but distinct process of
religious accommodation occurred with Greek Orthodox Christians, primarily Romanian and
Serbian, who were previously oriented on Constantinople. Thus Greek Catholicism did not
automatically mean a Rusyn identity.
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The general Habsburg policy of the era in question was to grant relative religious toleration,
especially by the late 19th century when full legal equality had been granted. In Transylvania, the
“four received religions” of Calvinism, Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Unitarianism had been
granted full rights as early as the 16th century, though this continued to exclude Jews and Orthodox
Christians, leading many Orthodox to join the sui juris Romanian Catholic Church. In 1848 and
again with the Ausgleich of 1867, Hungary recognized the equality of the six “received”
denominations (Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Reformed, Evangelical, Orthodox, and
Unitarian – Jews would have to wait). Even the nobility counted every religion among its members:
Roman Catholic in Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, and Poland; Protestant in
Bohemia and Transylvania; Greek Catholic in eastern Galicia; Orthodox in Bukovina and
Vojvodina; and even several Jews. While preference was often shown for Roman Catholics at
certain levels, and individual prejudice certainly continued, religious persecution was not an
official policy nor a motive either for mass migration or political dissent. Quite to the contrary, the
Habsburg lands had become a haven for Jews fleeing Russia and small Anabaptist or Unitarian
sects coming from Western Europe.
The case of Ruthenians in Bukovina reveals just how distinctly their ethnic identity could
revolve along religious lines.57 While most Orthodox ethnicities establish a national Orthodox
Church, Bukovinians did not. Instead, as part of the open options left to them by Hapsburg
authorities, the local Orthodox officials in 1873 created a multiethnic church consisting of
Ruthenians, Romanians, and Dalmatian Serbians. Firstly, this meant that Ruthenian Orthodox
chose not to associate with the Russian Orthodox Church. Secondly, Romanian Orthodox rejected
the Romanian (Moldavian) Orthodox Church of Habsburg Hungarian Transylvania.58 While the
rivalry between the Romanov and Habsburg empires may readily explain the first decision, the
second decision is more curious. After all, The Romanian Orthodox Church was in fact an already
established and tolerated Habsburg entity. But thirdly, and just as curiously, the non-Bukovinian
Serbs of Croatia-Slavonia also decided to join this ecclesiastical confederation rather than affiliate
with the Serbian Orthodox Church.
In effect, Ruthenians and other Bukovinians, including non-Slavs (Romanians speak a
Romance language), not to mention territorially separate Serbs, could center a critical aspect of
their ethnic identity (religion) within a multiethnic framework. In open rejection of most
assumptions of national identity, ethnic identity co-existed with “national indifference.”59 To be
clear, much of this was resisted, especially by Romanian elites, and much of it centered on the
distinctive vision of Bishop Eugen, whose legacy remains hotly contested in national
historiographies. However, that the Church was largely the creation of state and clerical authorities
does not negate its potential as a constituent to a multiethnic identity. That this could link to the
linguistic leg was made explicit when in 1838 bishop Eugen Hakmann (Romanian:
Eugenie/Evgenie Hacman; Ukrainian: Yevhen Hakman), the Metropolitanate of Bukovina and
Dalmatia in Chernivtsi, ordered that all communications of the Church in Bukovina be given in
both Romanian and Rusyn.
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Political Ruthenia
Political ideological options remained just as open. Despite the ardent claims of Ukrainian
nationalists since the 19th century, most Ruthenians existed for most of their Habsburg history with
no articulation of a separate nationalist identity – a situation similar to many other ethnic groups
in Central and Eastern Europe.60 They thought in terms of kinship networks, of regional clans and
tribes, and of distinct imperial privileges all within a multinational patchwork of such groups and
territories under a single monarch. Yet such status as a recognized estate, for example, rarely
applied to any but the ennobled elite, who jealously guarded their rights against commoners of
their own language and religion. And Ruthenian lords were all too ready to repress Ruthenian
peasants when it suited their needs.
We tend to think of the 19th century as an almost inevitable incubator of nationalism – and
rightly so as many historians have documented. Ruthenians also began the process of national
thinking. Indeed Habsburg officials unwittingly played into the emergence of Ruthenian
nationalism with their eagerness to classify their subjects by “nationality” – defined by overlapping
notions of race, language, and religion. These categories encouraged Habsburg citizens to think in
a nationalist framework along ethnographic lines.61 Following Herder’s logic of Herder, it was
only a small step to nationalism. Of course Habsburg officials applied their categories in a rapidly
changing context, and they did so with no intention of granting legitimacy to nationalist
aspirations, yet they unwittingly facilitated and codified such potential aspirations.
The ethnic terms without reference to separate nation-states, however, made perfect sense
to Ruthenians and Habsburg administrators who, while often keenly aware and even sympathetic
to ethnographic matters, nonetheless pursued an imperial policy that reflected the values of the
19th century as understood in their multiethnic imperial context. In the vast, ever-evolving, polyglot
Habsburg entity, citizenship, statehood, nationality, and language did not have an innate transhistorical correlation to nation-state identities. Indeed, most groups explicitly rejected such links
prior to 1918. Nationalist thinking was at best inchoate before the 19th century and only slowly
developed as numerous strands thereafter. One’s ethnicity simply had no essential link to
citizenship. Indeed, most citizens of Austria-Hungary, regardless of ethnicity, therefore fought
loyally for the empire to its bitter end in 1918.
If so, what do we make of a person from Galicia in 1900? It would not be self-evident to
the outside observer to what group the individual belonged. Were they an Austrian? Or a Galician?
A Ruthenian? A Rusyn? A Ukrainian? A Pole? A Slav (or alternately Slavonic, Slavish, or Slavic)?
A German? A Jew? All were used, some interchangeably, but just as often with a specific meaning
that excluded the other labels categorically. Was the primary identifier statehood? If so, if they
came from the crownland of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria in the Cisleithanian part of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and therefore were Austrian. Their passport was issued in this
manner. If they thought of themselves in local terms, even if speaking a Rusyn dialect rather than
Polish or German or Yiddish, they could have identified with a smaller group such as Lemko,
Boyko, Hutsul, or perhaps Goral.62 Unless they were an immigrant from Russia, they would not
have been Ukrainian.
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What if religion were their primary identity? They were likely a Ruthenian if Greek
Catholic, a Pole if Roman Catholic, most likely German if Protestant. Or, perhaps, they were a
Jew who identified with none of these labels except, maybe, Austrian, and was listed as German
in the state census because they spoke Yiddish. All of these labels made sense to Galicians and
expressed the lived complexity of their homeland.
Nationalist movements certainly did exist among Ruthenians by the end of the 19th century,
and these groups played a critical role in creating the future Ukrainian state. The point is not to
overemphasize their influence in the face of the power of these alternate identities, which shared
an equal legitimacy.
Habsburg Visions and Stereotypes of Ruthenia
Ironically, much of the contemporary imagination of Habsburg Ruthenians stemmed from
the visions of Polish Ukrainophiles in the 19th century. This Polish movement, the so-called
“Ukrainian School,” consisted of Polish Galician Romantics who sought to integrate Ruthenian
culture into their understanding of the new Polish Habsburg reality.63 Like most Romantics, they
glorified a lost medieval past and looked for its echoes amongst the peasantry. These ethnographers
and writers sought to discover a pure Ruthenian culture in the folklore, costumes, idioms,
architecture and elsewhere. The visual images, especially using the newly invented lithographic
technique, popularized a particular idealized folkloric view of Ruthenians. They generally
presented Ruthenians in a positive rural light, in no small degree as part of the Polish effort to
retain claims to all of the former Polish-Lithuanian state, including its Ruthenian population.
Figure: Drawing (1836) – Ruthenians of Different Regions: 1, 2. Galician Ruthenians; 3.
Carpathian Ruthenians; 4, 5. Podolian Ruthenians64
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Figure: Lithograph (1861) – Ruthenians of Chełm65
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Figure: Lithograph (1841) – Podlashian Peasants of Rushinian Origin66

The German-language press also cultivated a particular image of Ruthenia. 67 Ruthenians,
in this view, were first and foremost poor, to the point of abject destitution. In “Markttag in
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Barnow” [Market Day in Barnow] the German-Jewish Galician native Karl Emil Franzos wrote: “Today
the Ruthenians are one of the most unfortunate, downtrodden tribes on earth.”68 Franzos’ first
languages were Rusyn and Polish, and he remained deeply sympathetic, but he entitled this first
collection of stories from 1876 Aus Halb-Asien (From Half-Asia). In 1916, Alexander von Guttry
described Ruthenians as “slow and deliberate, suspicious, suspicious and withdrawn, but at the
same time gullible and clumsy.”69 In Jaroslav Hašek’s Czech novel, The Good Soldier Svejk, about
life in the Habsburg army written immediately after the war, the eponymous main character states,
“In the whole world have I seen nothing more magnificent than this stupid Galicia.” This view
was generally promoted by scholars; as late as 1981, Norman Davies asserted, “The life of the
Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria was short and sad. . . and few people mourned its passing.”70
On the other hand, Ruthenians were noted for their hospitality, their love of conversation
and music, and their resoluteness. Leopold von Sacher-Masoch specifically mentioned,
“Hospitality is a passion of the Ruthenians, and the humblest peasant practices it with a tact that
is sorely lacking in northern Germany in the most distinguished.” Sacher-Masoch also praised
them as “steadfast soldiers” and “good-natured in the highest degree, so that he rarely holds
grudges, and yet never seeks revenge even after the greatest oppression.”71 Indeed, Herder,
arguably the progenitor of modern nationalist thinking, positively gushed in his assessment of
Ruthenia, even if he conceptualized its territorially or ethnically in only the vaguest of terms (he
explicitly used the term “the Ukraine” to imply the borderlands between the West and Russia – a
sort of wild West between civilization and barbarism: “The Ukraine will become a new Greece;
the beautiful sky under which these people live, their happy disposition, their musical nature, the
fruitfulness of their land, etc. will awake some day; from so many small, savage peoples - as the
Greeks too once were - will develop a civilized nation, whose territory will extend to the Black
Sea and thence throughout the world. Hungary, these peoples, and a portion of Poland and Russia
will become participants in this new culture, and its spirit will go forth from the northwest over
Europe, which now lies asleep, and make a spiritual conquest of it.”72
Different, though equally ambiguous imaginations existed for Upper Hungary and
Bukovina where specific local contexts created alternate fault lines as well as collaborative
possibilities between Rusyns and Magyars, Romanians, and Slovaks, such as the multiethnic
religious structure of the Bukovinan Orthodox Church. But Ruthenians always had to contend with
the subtle dynamics of the German-dominated court in Vienna. Though Habsburg officials
remained distrustful of Magyars and Poles, they tended to regard Ruthenians as passive and loyal
but rather barbaric – again, the half-Asiatic motif.73 Following the stereotypes, and thus espousing
an Orientalizing attitude, most German (as well as Magyar and even Czech) Habsburgs considered
it a land in need of civilization. The stereotype ran deep, including among other Slavs and even
the Ruthenian elite.
Its poverty was proverbial; life expectancy and literacy low. Its massive and growing
population, the largest in any Habsburg territory, was regarded as a reserve pool of cheap labor
and military conscripts. Little investment, aside from fortresses and railroads, was made. 74 The
result, once the rail links penetrated the east in the late 19th century, was mass migration.75 Initially,
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the Viennese court considered the area more as a colony for ultimate Germanization, but after the
revolutions of 1848 administration was largely handed over to local elites. In Galicia, this meant
Poles, again heightening the Ruthenian-Polish tension. In Hungary after 1867, this meant Magyars,
who relentlessly pursued Magyarization. But in Bukovina, a more balanced power sharing
eventually emerged. Of course, Habsburg policies did initiate positive economic, cultural, and
political changes. Vienna encouraged the development of the world’s third largest crude oil
production in Galicia during the early 20th century, linked the region to Vienna and the West with
its rail network, advanced education, granted a (relatively) liberal constitution in 1867, and
ultimately provided a haven for Ukrainian nationalists coming from Russia.76 In any event, much
of the local population vented its frustrations not towards Vienna, but towards local rivals.
Friend or Foe? Relations between Ruthenians and Local Elites
While alliances were possible between Ruthenians elite and other groups, tensions always
existed as long as Ruthenians remained subordinated politically. Consequently, the local dynamics
defined much of the evolving identity constructs. In Galicia, the results were an increasing tension
with Poles, in Bukovina with Romanians, in Upper Hungary with Magyars – each of which would
lead to violence after 1918. But before that time, Ruthenians persistently tried to exercise their
concerns as loyal Habsburg subjects.
When, in 1848 during the Spring of Nations, the first Ruthenian political organization, the
short-lived Supreme Ruthenian Council, formed in L’viv, it adopted the views of bishop Levitsky.
It insisted that Ruthenians were a distinct Slavic ethnicity belonging to “the great Ruthenian
nation” but one that loyally supported the Hapsburg Monarchy. 77 The body asserted the historical
(if now only cultural) continuity of a single, united Ruthenia dating back to the medieval Ruthenian
Kingdom, and thus actively included Ruthenians in Russia as part of this concept – a step that
Habsburg officials were not interested in at the time. Yet Poles immediately felt threatened by this
first assertion of a political Ruthenian identity. Rather than making common cause, Polish and
Polonized Ruthenian elites immediately created the rival Ruthenian Congress (Sobor Ruskyi),
which, while also pro-Habsburg, sought to retain Polish domination of Galicia.
Faced with entrenched Polish power, even after the constitutional reforms of 1867, the
Galician Ruthenian elite subsequently fractured into two broad competing trends – Ukrainophilism
(not to be confused with the earlier Polish Ukrainian School) and Russophilism. In the Habsburg
context, these terms distinguished those who supported Ruthenian aspirations by supporting the
Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire but remaining pro-Habsburg from those who favored
Russia. The Russophilic political threat to the Habsburg state was self-evident. But both worked
against Polish nationalist desires.
For Vienna, the existence of Ruthenian Russophilism remained a problem since many
Ruthenians came to consider themselves part of the Russian nation.78 Russophilism, subsidized by
tsarist Russia, directly challenged the integrity of the Habsburg multination state. But the deep
sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the Polish elites of Galicia proved fertile for its spread. The roots also
stretched back to the so-called Old Ruthenians, who were pro-Habsburg but with whom they
shared a common concern about linguistic and cultural Polonization – concerns that focused on
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church Latinization and the so-called “alphabet war” of 1859 – 1861.79 The failure to achieve a
Habsburg “Triple Monarchy” after 1867 – one that included a Slavic leg – reinforced this
frustration. Later, the Russophiles formed the Ruthenian People's Party in Galicia in 1900, and,
since politics make strange bedfellows, they received the support of Galician Poles who saw it as
foil to growing Ukrainophilism.
Habsburg officials, while often tone deaf, were also pragmatic. They therefore ultimately
mandated the use of the Rusyn language in education, removing one of the Old Ruthenian and
Russophilic major grievances. As Paul Robert Magocsi, a leading historian of Ukraine, pointed
out, “As a result of this decision, the Old Ruthenian and Russophile orientations were effectively
eliminated from the all-important educational system.”80 The entire cultural basis for these
movements effectively ceased to exist; now, with the desired cultural autonomy effectively in
hand, one either pursued political goals inside of the monarchy (usually in the form of some sort
of a predominantly Ruthenian administrative district or an expansion of the Dual Monarchy to
include a Slavic or, even better, a Ruthenian component) or one sought an external political
alternative (some form of independent Ruthenian nation-state or Russian hegemony.) These last
options increased the stakes of the debate dramatically with the result that most Ruthenians chose
to remain loyally within the confines of the Habsburg dynasty.
Thus the primacy of local concerns consistently undercut Russophilism. The division
between the Old Ruthenians and the Russophiles over their respective stance on Austria eventually
resulted in an open split in 1909. Ultimately, Russophilism allied itself with pan-Slavism and
sought to unite Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia with Russia, and thus reunite all the lands
of ancient Rus and beyond. However, this goal only strengthened the Ukrainophiles, especially
since Russophilic activities aroused the hostile attention of the Habsburg state and was tantamount
to treason. Most Ruthenians, especially those with a stake in Habsburg affairs, pragmatically
rejected Russophilism. In the elections to the Galician provincial diet of 1913, for example, only
one Russophile deputy was returned compared to thirty Ukrainophiles. Ruthenians clearly
remained overwhelmingly loyal to the Emperor, as evidenced by their loyal and competent
performance in the Austro-Hungarian military, even when poorly funded, officered, and equipped,
until the collapse of the Monarchy in the autumn of 1918.81
Nonetheless, the Russophilic movement had devastating consequences for Ruthenians in
World War One when it led many Habsburg officers to fear civilian disloyalty and possible mutiny.
As a result, the military often interned or forcibly evacuated Ruthenians from near the front as
political suspects. Numbers vary, but up to 5,700 Ruthenians were held at the Talerhof
concentration camp near Graz from the fall of 1914 until 1917, often in conditions of extreme
brutality, including mass executions. The military fear was not that they were Ukrainian
nationalists but that they identified as Russian; in fact, if an internee voluntarily declared
themselves “Ukrainian” and renounced any Russophile sentiments, they could be released.82
“Ukrainian” simply had no explicit separatist nationalist meaning to Habsburg officials.
Further, after the Russian retreat many Russophiles followed them eastward and settled
behind Russian lines. With more than a little buyer’s remorse, a substantial number of these
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Russophiles, now faced with the real differences between Ukrainians and Russians inside of
Russia, became conscious Ukrainians rather than Ruthenian Russophiles. Many consequently
participated in the Ukrainian struggle for independence (1917–20) in central Ukraine, and others
returned to Galicia and supported the Western Ukrainian National Republic. As a side note,
Transcarpathian Rusyns, unlike Galicians, showed almost no interest in Russophilic identity and
instead contended with Magyarophilism.83
Instead, by 1900 more and more Ruthenians, especially from the intelligentsia, in
conversation with ethnic compatriots from Russia, especially those influenced by the Ukrainian
Mykhailo Drahomanov, began to identify with a more specifically Ukrainian identity. Ruthenian
Galician and Bukovinian intellectuals increasingly perceived “Ruthenian” as narrow-minded,
provincial, and Habsburg – in effect as non- or even anti-nationalist. As early as 1890, they formed
the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party in L’viv.84 The fact that they quickly changed the party’s
name to the Ukrainian Radical Party (URP) reveals how rapidly they were moving away from a
Habsburg-oriented Ruthenian identity. The URP’s policies also went against much of what was
integral to a prior Ruthenian self-understanding: it opposed the influence of the Greek Catholic
Church, the Austrian government, and cooperation with Galician Polish authorities (though it
supported solidarity with Polish workers and peasants.) Just as significant, in 1895 it issued the
first call for an independent Ukrainian state. While the strength and coherence of the URP should
not be exaggerated (it soon split into three competing movements), the emergence of a separatist
Ukrainian nationalism within the Habsburg lands presented a growing challenge to older
Ruthenian ethnic constructs.85
Indeed, despite an inconsistent resistance from the Habsburg Monarchy, multiple
nationally oriented identities developed under Habsburg rule in the 19th century. Under duress in
1867, Austria had accommodated Magyar nationalism in the Ausgleich and created the AustroHungarian Monarchy, granting autonomy to the Hungarian part of the empire. The Ausgleich
included an article that granted ethnic (as defined by language) equality: “All races of the empire
have equal rights, and every race has an inviolable right to the preservation and use of its own
nationality and language. The equality of all customary languages (“landesübliche Sprachen”) in
school, office and public life, is recognized by the state. In those territories in which several races
dwell, the public and educational institutions are to be so arranged that, without applying
compulsion to learn a second country language (“Landessprache”), each of the races receives the
necessary means of education in its own language.”86 The application of this principle was not
universal and specifically did not apply to the new Kingdom of Hungary, which showed little
toleration for the aspirations of its own minorities, most notably the Slovaks and Croats but also
the Rusyns of Upper Hungary.
But Ruthenians continuously found that they were most likely to achieve their goals within
the monarchy – some through assimilation but most through a patient policy of loyal demands.
Polish success in Galicia and Magyar success in Hungary had a corollary in the strong Czech
identity that had already led to a cultural flowering in every branch of the arts that translated into
demands for a “Triple Monarchy” and autonomy for the Lands of the Crown of St. Wenceslas.
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The so-called “South Slavs” or “Yugoslavs,” consisting of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, and
Montenegrins, as well as the small group of Pannonian Rusyns, proposed a variety of structures
that granted them similar autonomy or co-equality within both the Kingdom of Hungary and the
Empire broadly. Initially, Habsburg officials avoided the Czechs’ Triple Monarchy option, seeing
it as the beginning of the unraveling of the Empire, but Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne since
1900, sympathized with some variation of this solution as did the future emperor Charles I
(crowned in 1916).87
Ideologically, the various trends in this direction can be characterized as Austro-Slavism
(aka Austrian Slavism). Simply put, it conceptualized a political program to address the needs of
all Slavic peoples in the Habsburg lands.88 Influential Czech liberals especially embraced it in the
middle of the 19th century with the hope of creating a Triple Monarchy (the Kingdom of Bohemia
become a third leg alongside Austria and Hungary). František Palacký once stated, “Truly! If the
Austrian empire had not already long been in existence, one would have to hurry to create it in the
interests of Europe, in the interests of humanity itself.”89 The Pan-Slav Congress in June 1848
issued a proclamation prior to its convocation reinforcing these claims: “We solemnly declare that
we are resolved to remain loyal to the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine, which reigns over us by virtue
of hereditary right and constitutional principles. We are resolved to maintain the integrity and
independence of the empire by every means in our power. We repel all the accusations of
separatism, “pan-Slavism,” and pro-Russian tendencies which may be brought against us by evildisposed calumniators... Our national independence and our union depend on the maintenance of
the independence and integrity of the Austrian empire. The task which we essay is essentially
conservative, and there is nothing to cause inquietude to our fair-minded and liberal fellow-citizens
of other nationalities.”90
Since Austro-Slavism remained wedded to a Habsburg territorial framework, it was thus
consciously opposed to Russophilic pan-Slavism. However, the failure to achieve the goal in the
1848 revolutions, later combined with anti-Slavic Magyarization after the Ausgleich of 1867,
greatly reduced its initial appeal. Nonetheless, it remained one of many possible options available
to Ruthenians, and it especially appealed to Ruthenian elites already integrated into Hapsburg
power structures. Certainly, the precedent for a compromise had been set in 1867, and politicians
considered a series of compromises that could have included in a multifaceted confederation under
a Habsburg monarch. Even the Magyars reluctantly crafted such a compromise with Croatians by
granting autonomy to the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia in 1868. Such ideas culminated in 1906
when Aurel Popovici, a Romanian from Transylvania, proposed a United States of Greater
Austria.91 While a complex proposal, its core boiled down a territorial ethnic autonomy in a
confederative structure under the Habsburg monarch: “The great origin, language, customs and
mentality diversity of different nationalities requires, for the whole Empire of the Habsburgs, a
certain state form, which can guarantee that not a single nationality will be threatened, obstructed
or offended in its national political life, in its private development, in its national pride, in one
word – in its way of feeling and living.” The proposal thus redrew the imperial map, creating
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sixteen linguistically homogenous semi-autonomous states and various enclaves as part of a larger
confederation – one of which was naturally enough a Ruthenian East Galicia.92
Figure: Map – Proposed United States of Greater Austria (superimposed on the major ethnic
groups of Austria-Hungary in 1910)93

We should be aware how viable a confederative model was. The heir to the throne and
much of the Austrian court accepted it. It found popularity with the upper classes outside of
Hungary, including Ruthenians. It would have placated most of the ethnic demands throughout the
empire. Numerous precedents also existed: the Swiss Confederation since the Middle Ages
(German, French, Italian, and Romansch); the United Kingdom’s creation of a confederative
Canada in 1867 (Francophobic Quebec, Anglophonic Upper Canada, and the Maritime Provinces);
and the formation of Belgium in 1830 (French Walloons, Dutch Flemings, and a small number of
German speakers). A Habsburg Commonwealth seemed therefore to present a practical alternative.
Since most ethnic groups proved admirable and loyal soldiers for the Kaiser throughout World
War One, should we not assume that many, if not all, Ruthenians shared these loyalties and were
willing to express their identities fully in a more egalitarian confederative framework?94
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Regardless, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 effectively
shelved the confederative ideas. The war and subsequent peace treaties dismembered the empire.
And waves of ethno-nationalist violence plague Europe to this day.
Conclusion: Ruthenia and The Habsburg Multiethnic State
The Habsburg state, though ever changing, proved to be singularly stable and long lived.
It consisted of duchies and archduchies, kingdoms and imperial free cities, special territories such
as the Military Frontier, grand principalities and princely counties, voivodeships and banats.
Colloquially, all were Austrian for the simple reason that the core holding of the Habsburgs was
the Archduchy of Austria. In this complex empire, local privileges generally outweighed the power
of the monarch, and, even at the peak of territorial expansion in the late 19th century, the Monarchy
did not have a single ethnic majority. Neither Germans nor Magyars were the largest group; nor
was either homogenous. The more numerous Slavs separated themselves into dozens of different
groups, including Ruthenians. No single language or religion united the empire, though German
was the lingua franca of trade and bureaucracy and Roman Catholicism enjoyed the favor of the
court. Further, the Habsburgs actively encouraged various groups to move and settle freely within
their lands, especially in the under-populated regions of the east and on the borders with the
Ottoman Empire, leading to some of the most demographically diverse regions in Europe such as
in Bukovina.
This diversity, rather than encouraging Habsburg centralization actually fostered a
relatively tolerant liberalization. Following the Ausgleich, Austro-Hungarians also perceived their
homeland (though by no means universally) as comparatively peaceful, prosperous, and creative.
Fin-de-siècle Vienna, the world’s fourth largest city, was the heart of the crossroads of Europe
with a vitality that rivaled any other city of that epoch with a dynamic multiethnic population, and
regional Ruthenian centers such as L’viv and Chernivtsi followed suit on a more provincial scale.95
A Ruthenian nobility enjoyed a secure status, and the Habsburg military regarded the Ruthenian
peasantry as an essential component of the conscript army. In this context, a specifically nonseparatist Ruthenian identity could flourish.
But historical events of the 20th century erased this legacy. We are more informed by the
20th century, its destructive conflicts, and its constructive new nation-states. What was once known
as a coherent Mitteleuropa (Central Europe) with its cultural-territorial constituent Ruthenia
became the stage for much of the horrors of both the Third Reich and Stalinism as well as series
of later ethnic cleansings.96 Would it surprise us to learn that the 1993 film Schindler’s List took
place entirely in formerly Habsburg lands (Krakow and Auschwitz were in Galicia, Brünnlitz in
Moravia)? Or that almost all of the adult characters had been subjects of Kaiser Franz Josef? The
SS camp commandant Amon Goeth was from Vienna; Oscar Schindler from Zwittau; Itzhak Stern
from Krakow. Even the latest spasm of war and ethnic cleansing in Europe in 2022 is taking place
in Ukraine, much of which was formerly Habsburg.
Given the dynamic nature of the Habsburg Empire and the consequences of 20th century
nationalism, it is no wonder that we simplify matters a bit. However, it is worth making our
histories better reflect these complexities. Any attempt to impose a modern notion of nationality
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or ethnicity on Habsburg Ruthenians is at best either highly tendentious or anachronistic, at worse
a conscious distortion of the historical reality to serve a modern agenda. Ethno-nationalist
identities were certainly evolving by 1900, just not with foregone conclusions.
In short, while the modern Ukrainian state exerts a tremendous homogenizing influence,
the historical reality was pluri-centric, pluralistic, and even competitive between
Ruthenian/Ukrainian groups. But the result of this tortured history was that, by the end of the short
20th century (1918 – 1989), the ethnonym Ruthenian/Rusyn lived on only in a few locations:
among the Carpathian diaspora in Serbia’s Vojvodina and Croatia’s Srem, in sections of
Transcarpathia on the borders of Western Ukraine, Slovakia, and Hungary, and in the Rusyn
diaspora, especially in North America. Nation states largely congealed, especially after the
collapse of Soviet Communism and the Yugoslav Wars, around a dominant ethnic group, which
since 1918 all too frequently employed policies of cultural and physical ethnic cleansing. Even in
Ukraine, the Rusyns have not done well under these policies.
Post-Hapsburg, no overarching Ruthenia existed as either a self-understand trans-national
cultural territory or a political nation-state. Belarus and even more significantly Ukraine oriented
themselves on different ethnic claims. The remaining Rusyns were scattered amongst the postHapsburg nation-states, with varying degrees of pressure to assimilate, even when officially
recognized a national minority – as Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Croats, Serbs, and
Ukrainians.
Lest we think these Rusyn identities are irrelevant today, as recently as 2008 Ukraine's
Security Service officially accused a leader of the Carpathian Ruthenians of threatening Ukraine's
territorial integrity when Dimitriy Sidor, the chairman of the Association of CarpathianRuthenians, called for Carpathian-Ruthenian statehood. These Rusyns living mainly in the
Carpathian Mountains of Ukraine refuse to adopt the ethnonym “Ukrainian” to describe their
ethnic identity.97 Ironically, Russia uses the existence of a distinct Ruthenian identity to portray
Ukraine as a fascist state that represses its national minorities while simultaneously asserting that
Ukrainian identity is ahistorical. And there is truth to the historical persecution of Rusyns in
Ukraine as a legacy of both Ukrainian ultra-nationalism and Communism. To avoid persecution,
many of the region’s Ruthenians simply adopted the Ukrainian label. Sidor’s call for independence
thus appears to have mainly been about bringing awareness to the group rather than
independence.98
The anachronistic danger, of course, in labeling all contemporary and historical members
of these diverse ethnic communities as Ukrainian is that it homogenizes a heterogenous and polycentric reality that only in recent history began to coalesce around a distinct, universalizing claim
of a single unified ethnic identity. In short, the telling of the Ruthenian story is the weaving
together of several distinct tales, the end result of which was never clear, even if Ukrainian
currently dominates that narrative. Some became Ukrainians, others something else. All were
historically dependent constructs.
Part II of this article will focus on the identity formations of Ruthenians/Rusyns who
migrated to the United States, especially Michigan, prior to 1918.
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